Tuesday, September 09, 2003

SATISFACTION GUARANTEED?

Hans Blix, former Head of U.N. Weapons Inspections in Iraq, stated during an interview (aired on Sept. 8) feels that Iraq probably destroyed its weapons in the summer of 1991. Why would Hans Blix give Iraq the benefit of the doubt when there were new disclosures in 1995, and precursors were still be destroyed in 1997.


http://UNSCOM CHRONOLOGY


8 Aug 1995 General Hussein Kamel, Minister of Industry and Minerals and former Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, with responsibility for all of Iraq's weapons programmes, leaves Iraq for Jordan. Iraq claims that Hussein Kamel had hidden from UNSCOM and the IAEA important information on the prohibited weapons programmes. Iraq withdraws its third biological Full, Final and Complete Disclosure and admits a far more extensive biological warfare programme than previously admitted, including weaponization. Iraq also admits having achieved greater progress in its efforts to indigenously produce long-range missiles than had previously been declared. Iraq provides UNSCOM and the IAEA with large amounts of documentation, hidden on a chicken farm ostensibly by Hussein Kamel, related to its prohibited weapons programmes which subsequently leads to further disclosures by Iraq concerning the production of the nerve agent VX and Iraq's development of a nuclear weapon. Iraq also informs UNSCOM that the deadline to halt its cooperation is withdrawn.

22 Jun 1996 Iraq provides the fourth Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of its prohibited biological weapons programme.
Jun 1996 Iraq provides third Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of its prohibited chemical weapons programme. The progress achieved in verifying this disclosure, and subsequent attachments presented by Iraq, is described in the Commission's October 1997 report to the Security Council (S/1997/774).

Jul 1996 Iraq provides the third Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of its prohibited missile programme. The results achieved by the Commission verifying this disclosure, and subsequent attachments presented by Iraq, is described in the Commission's October 1997 report to the Security Council (S/1997/774).

Oct 1997 UNSCOM completes the destruction of additional, large quantities of chemical weapons related equipment and precursors chemicals. Iraq had previously denied that part of the equipment had been used for CW production. Only in May 1997, on the basis of UNSCOM's investigations, did Iraq admit that some of the equipment had indeed been used in the production of VX.

After continuous lies, deceit, non-disclosures, Hans Blix is willing to believe Saddam Hussein disposed of his weapons in the summer of 1991—when UNSCOM was still discovering and destroying from 1995 through 1997. Hans Blix was with the IAEA when it was discovered that Iraq had developed a nuclear weapon.

Hans Blix feels that the U.S. and U.K. wanted to jump to conclusions. Mr. Blix seems satisfied with his conclusions, in the face of information to the contrary throughout the history of inspections in Iraq. Mr. Blix ignores the 5 years of an information vacuum and assumes there is no more to the story. Apparently, he was satisfied prior to the discovery of the nuclear weapon in 1995. Now, he is satisfied again.

Would Sherlock Holmes be satisfied with an unsolved mystery?